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Abstract  
We use a novel laboratory experiment involving a die rolling task embedded within a coordination game 
to investigate whether complicity can emerge when decision-making is simultaneous, the potential 
accomplices are strangers and neither communication nor signaling is possible. Then, by comparing the 
behavior observed in this original game to that in a variant in which die-roll reporting players are paired 
with passive players instead of other die-roll reporters, while everything else is held constant, we isolate 
the effect of having a potential accomplice on the likelihood of an individual acting immorally. We find 
that complicity can emerge between strangers in the absence of opportunities to communicate or signal 
and that having a potential accomplice increases the likelihood of an individual acting immorally.  
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1. Introduction 
Complicity “the fact or condition of being involved with others in an activity that is unlawful or morally 
wrong” (Oxford English Dictionary), is difficult to study in the field. Successful complicity, by 
definition, is never observed and the few cases of apparent complicity that have been brought to light 
offer little foundation for generalizable insights. In many cases, complicity appears likely but cannot be 
proven, owing to a lack of evidence of directly relevant communication between the likely accomplices, 
but is suspected for two reasons. First, the accomplices are in decision-making contexts in which 
coordination is advantageous and there are opportunities to reciprocate either by directly assisting one 
another in an immoral act, by lying to protect one another’s and/or their collective reputations, or by 
turning a blind eye upon each other’s wrongdoing. In short, one likely accomplice is helping the other, 
knowing or anticipating that the other is reciprocating. Second, the likely accomplices share social ties, 
i.e., they are associates or colleagues and possibly also friends. However, we cannot infer from the 
existing case studies whether both of these features are necessary pre-conditions for the emergence of 
complicity. Put another way, the case studies do not lead to insights about precisely what “being 
involved with others” means in such contexts. In addition, in some cases, the likely accomplices appear 
to be types of individual that, a priori, we would not expect to engage in activities that are “unlawful 
or morally wrong” and this begs the question does the “being involved with others” increase the 
likelihood of an individual engaging in an activity that is “unlawful or morally wrong”. Consider, for 
example, the inquiry in the 1990s which revealed that many babies had died after heart surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary because medical professionals had not been applying appropriate standards of 
safety and had remained collectively silent about the issue for half a decade. A priori, one would not 
expect individuals who have selected into caring professions in medicine to behave immorally. So why 
did they? Was it because of their shared social ties and opportunities to communicate? Or was it owing 
to something less obvious, but arguably more fundamental, about the decision-making context they 
found themselves in? 
 
In this paper, first, we investigate whether individuals are willing to engage in complicit acts when they 
neither know nor are able to communicate with their potential accomplices. More specifically, we look 
at whether individuals are prepared to lie in order to coordinate with a stranger with whom they are 
unable to communicate in any way. Second, we investigate whether, ceteris paribus, having a potential 
accomplice – specifically, one who is a stranger with whom one cannot communicate – increases the 
likelihood of an individual acting immorally, i.e., whether there is a pure potential accomplice effect.  
 
If social ties are a necessary pre-condition for complicity, interventions that moderate social tie 
formation and maintenance between colleagues, such as staff rotation (Abbink 2004), might be 
sufficient to combat complicity. And if communication between accomplices is necessary for success 
in complicity, monitoring communication between potential accomplices could provide the basis for an 
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effective deterrent. However, if social ties and opportunities to communicate are not necessary, i.e., if 
the mere existence of someone who is facing the same moral dilemma and individual and collective 
incentives and with whom it would be advantageous to coordinate increases the likelihood of an 
individual behaving immorally, other forms of intervention will be necessary.  
 
To investigate whether complicity can emerge between strangers in the absence of communication of 
any kind, we designed and invited individuals to play the Complicity Game (CG thereafter), which 
combines the die-under-cup paradigm of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) with a coordination 
game. Specifically, in the CG two anonymous players are randomly paired. Simultaneously, each is 
asked to roll a die in private and report the outcome. The report of each player determines the monetary 
payoff received by the other. In addition, each player receives a bonus if both reports are 5 and a higher 
bonus if both reports are 6.2 In this game, the distribution of die roll reports will deviate from the uniform 
distribution of fair die rolls if the value players place on ensuring high monetary payoffs for themselves 
and others and on coordinating with others facing the same choice outweighs any psychological 
discomfort they experience when lying. Then, to isolate the potential accomplice effect, we designed a 
variant of the game in which there is no potential accomplice, while everything else, including any 
altruistic motivation for lying and the subjective distributions of anticipated monetary payoffs 
conditional on own die roll reports, remains unchanged compared to the CG.  
 
Finally, in another variant of the game, we removed the moral dilemma, while holding everything else, 
this time including the presence of an active playing partner, constant. In this variant each player reports 
a number between 1 and 6 without, first, rolling a die. 
 
In the absence of any moral dilemma, 97 percent of players reported a 6 – they tried and usually 
succeeded to coordinate on the monetary payoff dominant equilibrium. A significantly lower 59 percent 
of the players participating in the CG reported a 6 indicating that the moral dilemma had a bearing on 
their decision-making. Finally, a significantly lower again, 41 percent of the players participating in the 
‘no potential accomplice’ variant of the game reported a 6. These results indicate that a significant 
proportion of people are willing to behave immorally with the aim of coordinating to achieve a higher 
payoff, i.e., they are willing to engage in complicity, and having a potential accomplice increases 
individual willingness to behave immorally even when that accomplice is a stranger and communication 
is not possible.  
 
Our findings contribute to the growing behavioral and experimental literature on immoral behavior. In 
this literature, behaving immorally is associated with an intrinsic, psychological cost (Hurkens and 
                                                     
2  This bonus structure is explained in detail in section 3 of the paper. 
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Kartik, 2009; Abeler, Becker and Falk, 2014; Gneezy, Kajackaite and Sobel, 2016). However, this cost 
appears to be context specific. For example, people behave more honestly when they have been 
religiously or morally primed (Mazar, Amir and Ariely 2008), when they have to report their immoral 
intentions before they act (Jiang 2013), when deviating from honesty might reduce their own earnings 
by suppressing others’ effort (Ederer and Fehr 2007), and when immoral actions harm others (Gneezy, 
2005; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013).  
 
Closely related to our study is that of Weisel and Shalvi (2015), who found that, in a sequential two-
player game in which both must lie for each to secure a positive monetary payoff, when the first mover 
lied, the second mover reciprocated by also lying. Also related is the study of Kocher, Schudy, and 
Spantig (2016), who found, first, that people were considerably more inclined to lie when in groups 
within which communication was possible compared to when they were acting alone and, second, that 
people were marginally more inclined to lie in groups within which communication was possible when 
they had to coordinate on a lie with their co-group members in order to receive a positive payoff. 
However, in both of these studies some form of communication was possible. In the latter, the subjects 
in the group treatments could “chat” on-line before making their decisions in private, while in the former 
the first mover could signal intent through choice of action and the second mover observed this signal 
prior to making their choice. Further, neither of these studies endeavored to isolate the effect of having 
a potential accomplice while holding all other aspects of the decision-making environment constant. In 
Weisel and Shalvi (2015), the game always involved strategic complementarities and, while Kocher, 
Schudy, and Spantig (2016) compared the decisions made by people when acting alone to the decisions 
they made when in groups, many other aspects of the decision-making environment, including expected 
individual conditional (on own action) payoffs and the ability to communicate, varied between the 
individual and group treatments. 
 
The prior study that comes closest to identifying the potential accomplice effect is that of Conrads, 
Irlenbusch, Rilke and Walkowitz (2013). They investigated people’s willingness to lie in two contexts. 
In one (context A), the individual had to share her returns from lying about a die roll equally with 
another who had the same option to lie and must also share equally. In the other context (context B), 
the individual, again, had to share her returns from lying about a die roll equally with another and that 
other’s payoff was determined by both players’ die roll reports, but her own payoff was determined by 
her own die roll report and the outcome of a fair die roll rather than the die roll report of the other.3 
They found that people lied significantly more in context A, which is consistent with the existence of a 
potential accomplice effect. However, note that there two decision-making contexts differ in not one 
                                                     
3 Specifically, in context A, player i’s payoff equals 1/2 (pi + pj), where pi is player i’s die roll report, pj is player 
j’s die roll report, and player j’s payoff is the same. In context B, player i’s payoff equals 1/2 (pi + pc), where pc 
is the outcome of a fair die roll, while player j’s payoff continues to equal 1/2 (pi + pj).  
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but two ways. First, in context A the individual has a potential accomplice, while in context B she does 
not. Second, while in context A the individual is guaranteed to get the same payoff as her playing 
partner, in context B she is not; in context B, if she expects her playing partner to lie, she should also 
expect to end up with a lower payoff than her playing partner. The first of these differences is the 
difference we are interested in. However, given the second difference, the greater lying in context A 
cannot, unequivocally, be attributed to a potential accomplice effect. The potential inequality in payoffs 
owing to the other player lying in context B could, for example, temporarily increase the degree to 
which the individual perceives lying as immoral and, thereby, reduce the individual’s inclination to lie.  
 
Our experiment is similar to that of Conrads et al (2013) in that the playing partner in the ‘no potential 
accomplice’ variant of the CG remains present and continues to benefit from the decision-maker’s lying, 
while the decision-maker’s payoff can no longer be increased by the playing partner lying. However, 
instead of replacing the die roll report of the playing partner in the decision-maker’s payoff function 
with a fair die roll, we replace it with a random draw from the set of all die roll reports made in a prior 
session of the CG and the decision-makers knew that this was the case. Thus, we aim to hold expected 
payoffs, conditional on own reported die roll, constant across treatments, while nevertheless varying 
whether the decision-maker’s payoff depends on coordinating with another, i.e., with a potential 
accomplice, or aligning with a pre-determined payoff distribution. Further, to establish that we have 
succeeded in holding expected payoffs, conditional on own reported die roll, constant across treatments, 
we elicit and compare beliefs across the CG and the ‘no potential accomplice’ variant.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce a theoretical framework 
within which we explore the motivations that could be affecting behavior in the CG. In section 3 we 
describe our experimental design and procedures. In section 4 we present the results of two checks 
pertaining to the internal validity of the experiment. In section 5 we present the main results and in 
section 6 we conclude. 
  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we set out a simple ad hoc theoretical framework and use it to explore the various 
motivations that could affect behavior within the CG.  
 
First, consider the version of the game in which there is no die rolling, i.e., in which each of the two 
players chooses a number between 1 and 6 to report, each player’s choice directly determines the other’s 
monetary payoff, and then a bonus of one or two is added if both choose 5 or 6 respectively. This game 
is represented by the matrix below. 
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Player B’s report: 
 
Player A’s report:  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 
1 
1  
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
4 
1 
5 
1 
6 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
4 
2 
5 
2 
6 
3 
3 
1 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3 
5 
3 
6 
4 
4 
1 
4 
2 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
4 
6 
5 
5 
1 
5 
2 
5 
3 
5 
4 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
1 
6 
2 
6 
3 
6 
4 
6 
5 
8 
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This game has 18 pure-strategy Nash equilibria4 and the monetary payoff dominant equilibrium is both 
players report a 6. In this game, we expect players to report 6s for two reasons. First, while multiplicity 
of equilibria can lead to coordination failures, Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, (1990) have shown that, 
if there is a unique monetary payoff-dominant equilibrium, this is what players tend to focus on and 
select. Second, Mehta, Starmer and Sugden, (1994) have shown that, when there are multiple equilibria 
but one is visually and/or intuitively salient, players tend to coordinate on that. Owing to its position 
and monetary payoff-dominance in the game above, (6, 6) meets these criteria. 
 
Now, we introduce the die rolling, i.e., we move to the Complicity Game (CG), and consider the various 
possible psychological costs and benefits that accrue to subjects depending on their reports and how 
they relate to their die rolls. To describe formally the complete payoff function for players playing the 
CG, we define Δ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Players 𝑖 (𝑖 = A, B) individually observe a message sent by 
Nature 𝑂𝑖 ∈  Δ and, having made the observation, report an element of  Δ, 𝑅𝑖  ∈  ∆ , which may or may 
not equal Ο𝑖. The messages the two players observe are uncorrelated. The strategy space Δ
2 of each 
player has 36 elements (𝑂𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖) which are all the possible combinations of observation and report. Also, 
we assume that each player’s belief about the message sent by nature that the other player observes, 𝑂?̅?, 
is defined by a degenerate distribution, 𝑂?̅?  ∈  ∆.
5    
                                                     
4 The Nash equilibria of this game  are: (1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 2), (4, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 3), 
(4, 3), (1, 4), (2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 4), (5, 5), (6, 6) 
5 We could reformulate everything in terms of expected utility using a generic probability distribution over the set 
of possible beliefs, but the gain in generality would not justify the added complexity. 
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Let 𝑈𝑖 ∶  Δ
2 × Δ2  →  ℝ be the utility function of Player A (Player B’s utility function is symmetric). 
We assume this is given by: 
 
 𝑈𝐴[( 𝑂𝐴, 𝑅𝐴), (?̅?𝐵, 𝑅𝐵)] = [𝑅𝐵 + 𝛿(𝑅𝐴, 𝑅𝐵)] + 𝛼𝐴(𝑅𝐴) − 𝑠𝐴(𝑅𝐴)  
−𝑔𝐴(|𝑅𝐴 − 𝑂𝐴|) + 𝜏𝐴𝜅(𝑅𝐴, Ο𝐴, 𝑅𝐵 , ?̅?𝐵)   (UF1) 
 
The first component of UF1, 𝑅𝐵 + 𝛿(𝑅𝐴, 𝑅𝐵) is the monetary gain for Player A, where 𝑅𝐵 equals the 
report of Player B and 𝛿 ∶ ∆2→ {0,1,2} is a function that indicates whether the reports of the two players 
are both either 5 or 6 given by the following: 
𝛿 =    
{
 
 
 
 
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝐴 = 𝑅𝐵 = 5
2 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝐴 = 𝑅𝐵 = 6
 
 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒         
 
 
The second component, 𝛼𝐴(𝑅𝐴), captures altruism. Following the literature on altruistic white lies (Erat 
and Gneezy, 2011; Rosaz and Villeval, 2011), we assume that Player A may derive utility from securing 
Player B a higher monetary payoff. We assume that 𝛼𝐴(𝑅𝐴) is strictly monotonically increasing in the 
co-player’s monetary payoff.6 
 
The third component, 𝑠𝐴(𝑅𝐴), captures the non-monetary cost associated with internal shame. 
Motivated by Greenberg, Smeets and Zhurakhovska (2015), we define internal shame as the personal 
discomfort individuals experience when they imagine another player suspecting them of lying. 𝑠𝐴(𝑅𝐴) 
depends only on Player A’s report and is monotonically increasing in that report. 
  
The fourth component,  𝑔𝐴(|𝑅𝐴 − 𝑂𝐴|), captures the feeling of discomfort an individual experiences 
when making an untrue report, i.e., one that does not match nature’s message. We will refer to this 
component as guilt, although, conceptually, it is similar to Abeler, Becker, and Falk’s (2014) moral cost 
of dishonesty, Kartik, Tercieux and Holden’s (2014) preference for honesty, and Mazar, Amir, and 
Ariely’s (2008) notion of self-concept maintenance. With reference to Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008), 
who argued that lying to a small extent does not necessarily require someone to change their self-image 
as an honest person, we assume that 𝑔𝐴 is monotonically increasing. An individual feels guiltier or less 
able to think of themselves as an honest person the greater the distance between the message she 
observes and her report.  
 
                                                     
6 Note that this element would also be relevant when dice are not rolled and reports are chosen. 
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Finally, the last component 𝜏𝐴𝜅(𝑅𝐴, Ο𝐴, 𝑅𝐵, ?̅?𝐵) captures what we described above as the potential 
accomplice effect. We define a potential accomplice as someone with whom it would be advantageous 
to coordinate and who is exposed to and is expected to react in a similar way to the same incentives and 
moral dilemma. We assume that this mutual exposure and expected reaction to the same moral dilemma 
increases an individual’s utility by 𝜏𝐴 under the conditions specified by the indicator function 𝜅 ∶
 ∆2×∆2→ {0, 1} and we specify 𝜅 as follows:  
 
𝜅 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝐴 > 𝑂𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝐵 > ?̅?𝐵                      
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝐴 ≤ 𝑂𝐴 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝐴 > 𝑂𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑅𝐵 ≤ ?̅?𝐵
 
 
According to this component, Player A gains additional utility, 𝜏𝐴, from reporting a higher number than 
that which she observes (implied by 𝑅𝐴 > 𝑂𝐴) if she expects that Player B will respond in a similar 
way to the dilemma (implied by 𝑅𝐵 > ?̅?𝐵).  This component could be interpreted in several different 
ways. It could be capturing a reduction in internal shame, i.e., it could be that the discomfort that Player 
A experiences when she imagines another player suspecting her of lying is reduced if she, likewise, 
suspects that other player of lying. Alternatively or as well, it could be capturing a reduction in the 
feeling of guilt that Player A experiences on reporting a higher die roll than she observes if she suspects 
that the other player is similarly miss-reporting. Alternatively or as well again, it could be capturing 
additional utility derived from reciprocating an anticipated kind action by Player B, as described in 
models of intention based reciprocity. Although the general definition of this concept implies that 
reciprocators receive a signal regarding the intentions of the reciprocity receiver, formal models of 
intention based reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998; Falk and Fischbacher, 
1999) incorporate beliefs regarding such intentions. Applied to the CG, a Player A, who believes that 
Player B will report a higher than observed die roll, perceives that Player B is kind, reciprocates by also 
reporting a higher than observed die roll and, thereby, further increases her own utility.  
 
According to UF1, players for whom guilt and internal shame are important components of utility when 
they lie will be disinclined to play the CG in the same way that they play the game without die rolling; 
specifically, they will be less inclined to report 6 with the aim of coordinating. However, any such 
feelings of guilt and shame will be off-set in players who are altruistic and/or who are susceptible to the 
potential accomplice effect.  
 
Our empirical objective is to establish whether the potential accomplice effect is positive, that is 
whether 𝜏𝐴 > 0. We do this by comparing subjects’ behavior in the CG to subjects’ behavior in the no 
accomplice (NAc) variant of the game in which Player B is present but passive and, hence, not exposed 
to the moral dilemma, not open to suspicion, and not able to be kind. This is equivalent to a situation 
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where 𝑅𝐵 ≤ ?̅?𝐵 and, hence, 𝜅 = 0. The no accomplice variant is designed such that all the other 
monetary and psychological stimuli are identical to those in the CG.7 Consequently, if subjects exhibit 
higher levels of dishonesty in the CG compared to the NAc variant, this can be attributed to the existence 
of a potential accomplice, i.e., to 𝜏𝐴 > 0. 
 
The behavioral economics literature offers many other elements that we could have built into the utility 
function. For example, Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s (2007) belief based guilt, which is increasing in the 
extent to which a player thinks her actions will disappoint her co-player, could be included as a sub-
component of the potential accomplice effect or as a sub-component of internal shame. However, our 
objective is not to test theory but to identify an effect of decision-making context on willingness to lie 
and, this being the case, a relatively simple utility function such as UF1 is preferred.  
 
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
3.1.1. The Complicity Game (CG) 
Subjects are randomly matched into pairs. In each pair there is a Player A and a Player B. The players 
cannot identify or communicate with each other. Each player is asked to roll a fair six sided die once in 
private and report the outcome to the experimenter by writing it on a slip of paper. Each player’s report 
determines the monetary payoff of the other player in the pair. There are two exceptions to this; if both 
players report a 5, each gets £5 plus a bonus of £1 and, if both players report a 6, each gets £6 plus a 
bonus of £2. Play is one-shot and simultaneous.  
 
We included the bonuses for two reasons. First, in many real world examples of complicit lying, the 
benefits appear to be not only reciprocal but also collective. Second, the bonuses enhance the dominance 
and focality of (6, 6) and, thereby, increase the ease with which players could coordinate. We included 
a smaller bonus for (5, 5) because including a bonus for (6, 6) only could have had undesirable effects. 
For example, rendering (6, 6) too attractive could have reduced the likelihood of observing any cross-
treatment difference in behavior. Or, recalling that Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and Gächter 
and Schulz (2016) found that many people tend to lie but not maximally, rendering (6, 6) too attractive 
could have deterred individuals interested in avoiding suspicion and, thereby, rendered coordination 
harder to achieve.  
 
 
 
                                                     
7 We check that the design works in this regard in section 4. 
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3.1.2. The No Moral Dilemma (NMD) treatment (a design check) 
The NMD treatment is identical to the CG except that each player simply chooses a number between 1 
and 6 and reports his or her choice to the experimenter. 
 
3.1.3. The No Accomplice (NAc) variant 
In the NAc variant, as in the CG, subjects are randomly paired, in each pair there is a Player A and a 
Player B, the players cannot identify or communicate with each other, Player A’s task is to roll a fair 
six sided die once in private and report the outcome to the experimenter, and Player A’s report 
determines the monetary payoff of Player B. The difference between the CG and the NAc is that Player 
B is passive in the game and Player A’s monetary payoff is determined as follows. After Player A 
reports her die roll, she is asked to randomly draw a report from the set of all reports made during a 
prior session in which other subjects played the CG. Player A knows this and the details of the CG prior 
to rolling the die and reporting the outcome. Player A’s draw determines her own monetary payoff and, 
if her report and her draw are both 5 or both 6, she and Player B get a bonus of £1 or £2 respectively.  
 
In this variant of the game, while Player B remains present, Player A has no potential accomplice 
because Player B is passive and this, essentially, “turns off” the last component in utility function UF1.  
 
In addition, this variant was designed to hold one other factor constant relative to the CG. That factor 
was the Player As’ ex ante subjective distributions of anticipated monetary payoffs conditional on their 
own die roll reports.8 Describing the CG in full and then inviting the Player As to draw a report from 
the set of all reports made during a CG session is the natural way to do this. However, it has a drawback, 
the Player As might think of the players in that prior CG session as accomplices. While this is a concern, 
note that it could not drive a significant result in support of a positive potential accomplice effect; if 
anything, it would reduce the chances of us observing such an effect.   
 
 
3.2. Elicitation of active players’ beliefs about the distributions of decisions that would 
determine their monetary payoffs 
The internal validity of this experimental design depends critically on the ex-ante subjective 
distributions of the active players’ anticipated monetary payoffs, conditional on those players’ own die 
roll reports, being constant across the CG and the NAc variant. To check that this was the case, at the 
end of each session of the CG and the NAc variant, we invited players to participate in an un-
incentivized belief elicitation exercise in which they were asked to guess how many out of 30 
                                                     
8 In this regard, our experiment is similar to Bohnet and Zeckhauser’s (2004) and Bohnet, Greig, Herrman, and 
Zeckhauser’s (2008) experiments designed to isolate and measure betrayal (of trust) aversion. 
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participants in the CG would make a report of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. If the beliefs of active players under 
the CG and NAc variant are statistically indistinguishable, we can infer that so too were their ex-ante 
subjective distributions of anticipated monetary payoffs, conditional on their own decisions. 
 
3.3. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the CeDEx laboratory, University of Nottingham, in May 2015. In 
total, 294 students, recruited through ORSEE (Greiner 2004), participated in the CG, NAc variant, and 
NMD treatment. Of these, 63% were females. The large majority, 80%, were aged between 19 and 22 
years, 13% older than 22, and 7% younger than 19. Across treatments the samples were balanced with 
respect to gender and age. We ran 3 sessions of the CG, 6 sessions of the NAc variant, and 1 session of 
the NDM (design check) treatment. Each session lasted approximately 40 minutes and each participant 
earned between £1 and £8 plus a show up fee of £2. The smallest session was run with 24 subjects and 
the largest with 30 subjects. We started by running two sessions of the CG, one of which generated the 
reports used to determine the monetary payoffs for the Player As in the NAc sessions,9 then we 
randomized the treatments across the remaining sessions.  
 
The games were conducted using die, cups, pens, paper and envelopes. Participants were paired before 
they made their reports and anonymity was maintained throughout. The neutrally framed instructions 
were presented to the participants both verbally and in writing. The participants’ understanding was 
tested prior to them proceeding to the game.10
 
 
4. Internal Validity Checks 
In this section, we exploit two features of the experimental design to establish the experiment’s internal 
validity. 
 
4.1. Establishing a Coordination Benchmark 
The internal validity of our experimental design depends on subjects trying to coordinate on (6, 6) in 
the absence of any moral considerations. This needs to be checked empirically because, while (6, 6) is 
the monetary payoff dominant equilibrium, the CG, assuming no moral considerations, has multiple 
                                                     
9 30 die roll reports had to be generated by subjects participating in an early session of the CG before we could 
start running NAc variant sessions. Anticipating that turnout for the first session of the CG could be less than 30 
subjects, we scheduled two consecutive sessions of the CG before scheduling any NAc variant session. In fact, 
both of the first two CG sessions had a turnout of 30 players. We tossed a coin to determine that the second session 
of the CG would be used for the draw in the subsequent NAc sessions.    
10 If a participant gave one or more wrong answers in the test, a research assistant went through the instructions 
with them again and, then, the participant retook the test. Between 1 and 3 participants retook the test in each 
session. The retake rate was statistically indistinguishable across the CG and NAc according to a t-test (p-value= 
0.9477).  
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equilibria. We included the NDM treatment in our design to facilitate such a check. The data from the 
NDM treatment is graphed in Figure 1. It indicates that, in the absence of any moral considerations, 97 
percent of the time subjects choose 6.11  
 
Figure 1: Relative frequencies of numbers chosen in the No Moral Dilemma treatment (n=30) 
 
4.2. Consistency of beliefs across treatments 
The internal validity of our experimental design also depends on the active players under the CG and 
NAc variant having indistinguishable subjective beliefs about the likelihood of others making each of 
the possible reports and, hence, indistinguishable ex-ante subjective distributions of their own monetary 
payoffs, conditional on their own decisions. 
 
 
                                                     
11 Exactly 29 out of 30 players reported a 6. 
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Figure 2: Elicited beliefs about the distribution of reports under the CG and the NAc variant 
 
Figure 2 presents the elicited belief distributions averaged across, in the case of the solid line, all the 
participants in the CG and, in the case of the dotted line, all the participants in the NAc variant.12 The 
figure suggests that there is no difference in players’ beliefs across the two treatments. According to a 
multivariate analysis-of-variance we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of beliefs is 
identical across the two treatments (p-value 0.338).13
 
 
5. Main Results 
Having established our experiment’s internal validity, we turn to our main results. First, by comparing 
the distribution of die roll reports in the CG to the expected distribution for a fair die, we address the 
issue of whether strangers try to coordinate in the absence of communication when coordination 
requires that they lie. Second, we use the die roll reports made in the CG and NAc variant to test the 
hypothesis that people are more willing to lie when they have a potential accomplice with whom it 
would be beneficial to coordinate and who faces the same incentives and is exposed to the same moral 
dilemma, i.e., that 𝜏𝐴 > 0.  
 
Figure 3 graphs the relative frequencies of the die roll reports made in the CG and the NAc variant. The 
figure also presents the expected distribution of fair die rolls, which is uniform, with each number 
                                                     
12 Under the NAc variant, beliefs were elicited from both the active Player As (n=87) and the passive Player Bs 
(n=87). Of these, 7 did not respond to belief elicitation questions. In the figure, we graph the mean beliefs of the 
active and the passive players in the NAc variant pooled together. If the beliefs of the passive players in the NAc 
are excluded, the graph is almost identical. 
13 If the beliefs of the passive players in the NAc are excluded from the multivariate analysis-of-variance, the 
conclusion is the same (p-value 0.3833). 
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expected to arise in approximately 16.7 percent of rolls (dotted line). Table 1 presents the percentages 
of each die roll report under each treatment. 
 
Figure 3: Die roll reports in the CG and the NAc variant 
 
 
5.1. Do strangers try to coordinate in the absence of communication when coordination 
requires that they lie? 
Figure 3 and Table 1 indicate that 59 percent of the reports made in the CG were 6. This is significantly 
higher than the 16.7 percent expected in the absence of lying; according to a two sided binomial test, 
adjusted to account for the fact that we perform six such tests (one for each possible report value) by 
applying Benjamini and Hochberg’s (1995) method,14 we can reject the null hypothesis that the 
percentage of reports of 6 in the CG is consistent with no lying at the 1 percent level. The table also 
indicates that, in the CG, the frequencies of low-value die rolls were significantly below the 16.7 percent 
expected in the absence of lying. Further, according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the distribution of reports made in the CG, as a whole, is consistent with no lying 
at the 1 percent level (p-value<0.01). 
 
  
                                                     
14 The Benjamini-Hochberg method involves: sorting the test p-values in ascending rank; multiplying each by the 
number of separate tests being performed (in our case six); then, dividing each by its rank. Thus, the greatest 
adjustment is made to smallest p-value. 
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 Table 1: Die roll reports in the CG and NAc variant   
 (1) (2) (3) 
 CG  
(n=90) 
NAc  
(n=87) 
Difference                     
(percentage points)  
Panel A 
Die roll report 
1 4.44% ǂ ǂ ǂ 4.60% ǂ ǂ ǂ -0.16  
2 3.33% ǂ ǂ ǂ 11.49%  -8.16 * 
3 7.78% ǂ ǂ 10.34%  -2.56  
4 12.22%  11.49%  0.73  
5 13.33%  20.69%  7.36  
6 58.89% ǂ ǂ ǂ 41.38% ǂ ǂ ǂ  17.51 *** 
Panel B   
H0: Report distribution same as for a fair die    
     K-S test  p-value <0.01      p-value <0.01   
Panel C   
H0: Mean reports in CG and NAc the same    
     t-test, two-sided p-value = 0.041  
    Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value = 0.023 
Panel D   
H0: Report distributions in CG and NAc the same   
    K-S test p-value = 0.100 
Notes: In Panel A, columns (1) and (2) report relative frequencies and column (3) reports differences 
in those relative frequencies; in columns (1) and (2), the significance of the difference between the 
reported relative frequency and that expected for a fair die according to two-sided binomial tests, 
adjusted to account for the fact that we perform six tests per distribution (Benjamini and Hochberg, 
1995), is also indicated (ǂ ǂ ǂ and ǂ ǂ indicate significance at 0.01 and 0.05 respectively); in column (3), 
the significance of the difference between the treatments according to t-tests, adjusted to account for 
the fact that we perform six tests, is also indicated (*** and * indicate significance at 0.01 and 0.10 
respectively); Panels B, C, and D describe tests of other hypotheses relating to the die roll distributions 
and report the results; in the second and fourth panel, K-S indicates Kolmogorov-Smirnov. 
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Note also that the 59 percent of reports of 6 in the CG is significantly lower than the 97 percent of 
subjects who chose a 6 in the NMD treatment (p-values from unadjusted t-test < 0.001). 
 
These results indicate that a significant proportion of people try to coordinate with strangers in the 
absence of communication when coordination requires that they lie. 
 
5.2. Is there a potential accomplice effect? 
Figure 3 and Table 1 also indicate that reports of 6 were more frequent in the CG, at 59 percent, 
compared to the NAc variant, at 41 percent. According to a two-sided t-test, adjusted to account for the 
fact that we perform six such tests, one for each possible report value, we can reject the null hypothesis 
that the proportion of reports of 6 in the CG and the NAc are the same at the 1 percent level. Further, 
according to a t-test and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we can reject the null hypothesis that the mean 
reports made in the CG and the NAc are the same at the 5 percent level (p-values 0.041 and 0.023 
respectively). Only one test, the Kolmorogorov-Smirnov test of the null hypothesis that the distributions 
of reports made in the CG and the NAc are the same, yields a result on the borderline of significance at 
the 0.10 level. 
 
These findings indicate that, ceteris paribus, subjects are more inclined to lie when they have a potential 
accomplice.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The objective of this study is to investigate whether strangers try to coordinate in the absence of 
communication when coordination requires that they lie and whether people are more willing to lie 
when, in so doing, they are trying to coordinate with a potential accomplice, i.e., another person facing 
the same potential individual and mutual benefits and the same moral dilemma, even when that 
individual is a stranger and communication is not possible. We conducted an experiment focused on a 
game, the Complicity Game (CG), in which the two players could maximize their individual and 
collective earnings only if they were willing to coordinate by lying.  
 
By comparing the distribution of die roll reports made in the CG to the expected distribution for a fair 
die, we found that a significant proportion of strangers are indeed able and willing to coordinate in the 
absence of communication when coordination requires that they lie. Then, to isolate the effect of having 
such a potential accomplice in the CG, we also designed and conducted a variant of the game, the NAc 
variant, in which the one active player had no potential accomplice, but everything else was the same. 
By comparing the distributions of die roll reports made in the CG and the NAc variant, we found that 
subjects were more inclined to lie when they had a potential accomplice. 
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These results indicate that complicity does not require social ties or communication and that, to an 
extent at least, the emergence of complicity is owing to a desire to coordinate with others facing similar 
incentives even when coordination requires immoral behavior. These findings are relevant to both the 
public and the private sector. They suggest that interventions designed to moderate social tie formation 
and maintenance or monitor communication between colleagues may not be sufficient to eliminate 
complicit wrongdoing. Measures designed to inculcate moral values within individuals may be the 
answer, but further research is required. As a next step, it would be interesting to establish whether 
coordinating with others in such contexts reduces feelings of guilt or internal shame or increases feelings 
of satisfaction associated with reciprocating the anticipated kindness of others.
18 
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